THE RACE FOR AFFORDABLE MASS
The next advantage in warfare will depend not only on designing lower-cost weapons, but on building the supply chains capable of producing them at operational scale
The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have launched the world into a new era of warfighting, one where ‘affordable mass’ – that is, the capacity to maintain massive guided munitions stockpiles and replenish them – is at the centre of every major military’s planning. Affordable mass encompasses both small-factor unmanned aerial systems (UAS), such as quadcopters, first-person-view (FPV) drones and interceptor drones, and long-range cruise missile-type weapons that as recently as a decade ago were the star of a nation’s arsenal.
To give affordable mass a tangible and quantifiable perspective, in the first half of 2026, Russia launched more than 1,400 jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones at Ukraine. While derived from the Iranian Shahed-136’s airframe, the Geran-3 is powered by a miniature turbojet engine, making it, for all practical purposes, a cruise missile. The Geran-4 leverages a more traditional cylindrical design akin to older cruise missiles, but is simpler owing to the use of fixed stabilisers or wings and an externally mounted turbojet. This removes the need for complex flight controls within the missile itself. Ukrainian media report that Russia is gearing up to manufacture over 3,000 Geran-3/4 drones a month.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces reported conducting 2,359 deep-strike missions in Russia in June 2026. Ukraine’s mainstay strike weapons included Fire Point’s FP-1, a piston-powered drone with a range of 2,600km (analogous to the Shahed-136), and the FP-5, a large cruise missile with a stated range of around 3,000km. However, like Russia, Ukraine is also working towards low-cost cruise missile applications, such as the Palianytsia and Bars.
In the Middle East, Operation Epic Fury saw the US expend more than 1,000 Tomahawk and roughly 1,100 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles in 39 days. This reduced the US’ critical munitions stores to half their pre-war levels. The Center for Strategic and International Studies assesses that it takes around 52 months, from budget approval to full-rate delivery, to replenish the stores of traditional US cruise missiles.
To its credit, the Pentagon foresaw this issue before the ongoing war commenced and introduced the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) programme in the US Air Force’s 2026 budget proposal, released in the spring of 2025. In July this year, the Pentagon announced seven-year framework agreements under FAMM to supply up to 8,000 guided missiles per year, with plans for 28,000 missiles over five years.
Under FAMM, the Pentagon selected three systems: the Anduril Barracuda-500, the CoAspire Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM), and Zone 5’s AGM-188A Rusty Dagger. In tandem, the Pentagon is also managing other initiatives to augment its rapid-strike capability, such as the Castelion Blackbeard hypersonic missile. This element seems to involve a greater focus on conventional ballistic missiles analogous to Iran’s Fattah-series or Türkiye’s Tayfun-series.
Finally, Europe is also moving towards similar concepts through programmes such as MBDA’s Deluge and Crossbow, which aim to bring the cost control and simplicity of the Geran-3 as well as FAMM-series munitions, respectively. The UK too is taking on significant work in driving the emergent concepts to fruition via Project BRAKESTOP. MBDA’s Crossbow was, in fact, developed for Project BRAKESTOP. In addition, MGI Engineering and Rotron Aerospace are working on low-cost cruise missiles and low-cost piston-engine one-way attack (OWA) drones, respectively.
Taking all this activity together, it is clear that affordable mass has pivoted towards low-cost cruise missiles and conventional ballistic missiles for scalable high-reliability strikes leveraging speed and terminal velocity, but at a lower cost than traditional munitions; piston-powered OWA drones or loitering munitions for long-range salvo depth to stress enemy air defences and force them to expend kinetic interceptors; and deep stocks of electrically driven quadcopters, FPVs and other small-factor drones.
However, the adoption is not uniform, at least not in every aspect. The US, EU and UK seem to be trending towards jet and piston-powered long-range strike munitions. While there has been a policy call to adopt small-factor drones like quadcopters, the actual programming today is centred on liquid or solid fuel-powered platforms. Unlike China, the Western powers have yet to lean on small-factor drones as a central piece of their emerging warfighting.
This focus is likely driven by industrial and supply chain limitations. China dominates the production cycle for the upstream inputs necessary for small-factor drones, from rare earth and mineral mining and refining all the way up to efficient, large-scale manufacturing. The low-cost batteries, electric motors, flight controllers, plastic and 3D-printed moulds, and other inputs for scalable applications all emanate from China.
The Pentagon’s current policies for small-factor drones do not universally prohibit Chinese inputs. The bans are specific to optronics and communications, but not batteries or motors. However, Beijing has caught on to these dependencies and has begun binding the availability of its upstream inputs to stricter end-use controls and case-by-case reviews of US-bound shipments, thus resulting in more Chinese suppliers declining to take US-bound orders at all. In effect, not every major military can leverage affordable mass at every layer.
Munitions that leverage more traditional inputs, such as turbojets, pistons and rockets, readily draw on existing American and European manufacturing and supply chains. So, when the wider production infrastructure adapts to the costing requirements, it tends to deliver fairly rapidly. For example, even the US has begun fielding its own Shahed-style piston-powered loitering munition – Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) – at a comparable price point. But the inability to scale small-factor applications could leave gaps.
This is where Europe has earnestly leaned into its traditional strengths, even in domains that have demanded small-factor drones, such as anti-drone interceptors. MBDA’s new Counter Mass Interceptor (CMI), for example, draws on rocket motors used in 122mm artillery rockets. MBDA’s idea is to repurpose this long-produced, mature rocket for the counter-drone role without compromising on cost or scale. Likewise, at least one of the interceptor concepts under the EU Low-Cost Effectors and Autonomous Platform (LEAP) also involves a guided rocket. Similarly, the US has also been arming its combat aircraft with 70mm laser-guided rockets for the counter-drone role.
Thus, one could see a future where the Western approach to kinetic drone interceptors draws more on rockets than on drone-based interceptors. That said, Ukraine has shown that it is possible to indigenise the production of upstream inputs for small-factor drones, such as electric motors, propellers and optronics. These localised alternatives come at a higher cost than Chinese-supplied inputs (widely reported as “dozens of percentage points more expensive”), but there is a basis and pathway for Europe and the US to one day take on this work, at least for specifically military applications.
The UAE operates at the intersection of these trends and, in many cases, foresaw them. EDGE Group, for example, displayed its NASEF family of low-cost cruise missiles in November 2025 alongside the electrically powered HUNTER series of loitering munitions, ranging from small-factor, soldier-portable systems to larger variants.
Ukraine has shown that it is possible to indigenise the production of upstream inputs
The UAE is clearly seeking to achieve a full-spectrum adoption of affordable mass, from cruise missiles to small-factor drones. As seen in its partnerships with US start-ups such as Anduril, EDGE Advanced Concepts has been working through the design-for-manufacturing paradigm from the outset. Thus, not much of what has been happening in terms of affordable mass munitions usage is conceptually new to the UAE.
The UAE is arguably pulling ahead of trends by building the supply chain for the future of warfare, affordable mass included. This has involved combining native industrial strengths at home with those of overseas partners via 13 mergers and acquisitions led by EDGE, and 20-plus joint ventures globally, including in the EU. EDGE possesses the inputs necessary to manufacture affordable mass-based solutions; the challenge, and the opportunity, will be in driving down costs.
For example, EDGE has brought processes that demand high energy use, including the manufacturing of circuit boards and optronics, to the UAE, where energy and capital are available, but it keeps other parts of the supply chain with the rest of its global network. In effect, the UAE’s strategy is less about relentless localisation and more about utilising partner strengths, even if abroad, while ensuring that one body (EDGE) coordinates and leads in bringing these resources together.
Competitively, this allows EDGE to market its solutions wherever it operates, from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe and Latin America. This gives Nato members more options on the one hand, and on the other, gives greater network access and leverage to those that are losing access to Chinese suppliers, such as India and the US.
Read more
